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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MICHAEL W. HOM, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
PUBLIC SAFETY, a governmental 
agency; CHERIE ERTEL; DOUGLAS 
BODRERO; A ROLAND SQUIRE; 
ARTHUR HUDACHKO; BART 
BLACKSTOCK; and JOHN DOES, 
Defendants and Appellees, 
Case No. 970592-CA 
Priority 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
The Defendants-Appellees Utah Department of Public Safety 
(the "Department"), Cherie Ertel, Douglas Bodrero, A. Roland 
Squire, Arthur Hudachko, and Bart Blackstock (the "Defendants") 
submit this brief in response to the opening brief of Plaintiff-
Appellant Michael W. Horn ("Horn"). 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this case, which was 
transferred to this Court by the Utah Supreme Court on October 
15, 1997. £££ Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (j) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court correctly hold that Horn failed to 
state a claim against the Department for breach of an alleged 
written employment contract because Horn's former employment 
relationship with the state was governed solely by statute? 
2. Did the trial court correctly grant summary judgment, 
dismissing Horn's federal disability discrimination claim against 
the Defendants because it was barred by the four-year residual 
statute of limitations and because the discovery rule did not 
toll the limitations period? 
Standard of Review: All of the above issues are questions 
of law, reviewable de novo. See Berenda v. Lanqford, 914 P.2d 
45, 47 (Utah 1996) (reviewing summary judgment dismissing claims 
based on statute of limitations)• 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
The following provisions set forth in Addendum A to this 
brief are determinative of, or of central importance to, this 
appeal. 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-2 (1986) 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-15 (1986) 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-18 (1986) 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3) (1996) 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(4) (1996) 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case arose over seven years ago when Horn was fired from 
his career service position as a computer programmer with the 
Department. Horn brought suit for breach of an alleged written 
employment contract and for disability discrimination under the 
federal Rehabilitation Act. The trial court granted summary 
judgment dismissing Horn's claims because the applicable 
limitations periods had expired. More specifically, the court 
held that: (1) Horn's employment relationship with the state was 
governed by statute, rather than by a written contract, and the 
three-year limitations period for claims of statutory entitlement 
had expired; and (2) Horn's federal disability discrimination 
claim was barred by the four-year residual limitations period, 
and the discovery rule was inapplicable. 
Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below 
On March 21, 1994, Horn commenced this action by filing a 
complaint in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County. 
Horn's original state court complaint was brought only against the 
State of Utah, and purported to assert two claims: breach of 
employment contract and blacklisting. Approximately one year 
later, on March 6, 1995, Horn amended his complaint to add the 
individual defendants, and three new claims: disability 
3 
discrimination under § 504 of the federal Rehabilitation Act 
against all of the Defendants, breach of the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing against the Department only, and tortious 
interference with a contractual relationship against the 
individual defendants. Horn continued to assert his breach of 
employment contract claim against the Department only, but 
amended his blacklisting claim to include the individual 
defendants Bodrero and Squire. In March 1995, Defendants 
answered the amended complaint, denying all allegations material 
to this appeal. 
In December 1996, the Defendants filed a motion for summary 
judgment seeking dismissal of all of Horn's claims. In opposing 
the motion for summary judgment, Horn filed a motion to use the 
discovery materials from the federal case, which the court 
granted. On March 5, 1997, after full briefing and oral 
argument, the court granted the motion for summary judgment and 
issued a statement of grounds for its decision. The court 
dismissed Horn's breach of employment contract claims, including 
the claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, because the four-year limitations period for actions 
upon oral contracts had expired and the employment relationship 
between Horn and the state was governed exclusively by statute, 
rather than written contract. The court dismissed Horn's federal 
disability discrimination claim because the applicable four-year 
4 
limitations period had expired. Finally, the court dismissed 
Horn's tortious interference and blacklisting claims because Hom 
had failed to provide notice of those claims in accordance with 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, because the Act retained 
immunity for those claims, and because the applicable limitations 
periods had expired. Hom filed his notice of appeal on April 3, 
1997. In his opening brief, Hom challenges only the rulings 
dismissing his claims for breach of an alleged written employment 
contract and disability discrimination. 
Statement of Facts 
Administrative Proceeding 
Hom was involuntarily terminated from employment with the 
Department effective March 2, 1990. In about March 1990, Hom 
appealed the Department's decision to terminate his employment to 
the Career Service Review Board ("CSRB"). R. 350-51 (excerpt 
from Hom v. Sauire, Civil No. 91-C-1016W, Memorandum Decision and 
Order at 13-14 (D. Utah December 1, 1994).a An evidentiary 
hearing was scheduled for April 1990, but upon Horn's motion was 
continued without date. Xd. In about October 1990, Hom 
requested a stay of the CSRB proceedings pending the outcome of 
his prospective federal suit. id. In December 1992, the CSRB 
issued an Order to Show Cause Why Appeal Should not be Dismissed. 
lA complete copy of the Memorandum Decision and Order is 
attached as Addendum B. 
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Id. In January 1993, the CSRB issued an Order and Notice Setting 
Forth Deadline for Dismissal if Case not Timely Prosecuted, 
directing Horn to schedule an evidentiary hearing on or before 
March 31, 1993, or Horn's appeal would be dismissed. Id. Horn 
apparently failed to do so, and his appeal was dismissed for 
failure to prosecute in April 1993. Id. This Court affirmed the 
dismissal. Id. 
Federal action 
Horn also brought suit against the Defendants by filing a 
complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in federal district court in 
September 1991. R. 413. In July and August 1994, Horn took the 
depositions of several Department employees, who testified that 
before his termination Horn had been "acting nutty," R. 975, 
doing "bizarre things," id., and that his behavior had become 
threatening, abusive and intimidating. R. 1038-39. 
In October 1994, nearly two years after the deadline for 
amending pleadings, when the lawsuit was over four years old, and 
on its fourth trial setting, which was only two months away, Horn 
moved for leave to file an amended complaint to add a disability 
discrimination claim under § 504 of the federal Rehabilitation 
Act. R. 414. Horn claimed that before taking the employees' 
depositions, he had been unaware of any factual basis for the 
claim. Id- The district court denied the motion on the ground 
that it was untimely and would unduly prejudice the Defendants. 
6 
I d . 1111 !: i n i d l e I ",' I Hi ft'- 1,P !:,•! I i I i ,", I i n I r I i \\ H n t e d . s u m m a r y 
judgment against Horn on his § 19B3 claim, y S91-41U, and that 
dec:i s:i : r: • e s «E ff:l :i : ITI = • :I 1: •;  .« !:h = federal court of appeals in £ r - i 1 
1996, F 411-416. 
State court action 
On March 2\ , . -
 :/ ^jt>. Drought this actioi i. Ii i 1 li s amended 
complaint, Horn alleged tha* " • p Department terminated his 
omnloymen: ,.~z: >L J u La-.,. 
express contract - - employment fbetween Mr. Hem and the 
He further alleged that the Defendants had discriminated 
of the federal Rehabilitation Act. ^32-J4. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Horn failed to bring suit against the Defendants within the 
limitation periods applicable to his claims. Homfs wrongful 
termination claim against the Department is properly 
characterized as statutory, rather than contractual, and the 
three-year limitations period for an action for a liability 
created by statute had expired when Horn brought suit. In 
addition, Horn allowed the four-year limitations period applicable 
to his federal disability discrimination claim to expire before 
bringing suit. The discovery rule does not toll the time for 
filing Horn's discrimination claim because at the time of his 
termination, Horn had good reason to suspect that Department 
employees perceived his behavior to be abnormal and possibly 
mentally disturbed. Accordingly, the trial court properly 
granted summary judgment dismissing Hom's claims, and this Court 




THE TRIAL COURT! CORRECTL * DISMISSED HOM'S 
BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM BECAUSE HOM'S 
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE DEPARTMENT WAS 
STATUTORY RATHER THAN CONTRACTUAL 
A. Horn's Wrongful Termination Claim is Statutory, Not 
Contractual 
This Court should affirm the dismissal of Horn's breach of 
c o n L. i «i i L i h i iin d'ljri ! 11 I 1 I IH'fVM t i can i s e . c a r e e r 
service employee, Horn's relationship with the Depar tment was 
c "-- -e *•• -r'Dyment contract existed 
between Horn and the Department. Horn's claim-was commenced on 
K-"-"^ ' ' • IUUI years after he was involuntarily 
terminated from
 Ai±& employment with the Department on Marc-
199C, and is therefore barred by the three-year limitation period 
for "an action tcr a *iai;--ity wieaie: 
state " S e el V^ rnde Ann. i 78-12-26(4) (1996) (1996 amendment 
made stylistic 
The Utah State Personne" Management Ac'., Utah Code Ann. §§ 
< "
r
' ( * * , gc verns the 
employment of most state cait-c: be: vice employees, including Horn. 
2This brief cites to the version of the Personnel Act in 
effect at the time Horn's employment was terminated in March 1990, 
unless otherwise stated. The Personnel Act has been amended 
since then and now extends to section 67- 3 9 40 I his brief will 
note amendments tc *~u? relevant provisions when the provisions 
are first cited. 
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In asserting a breach of contract claim against the Department, 
Horn relies exclusively on the Personnel Act and the 
administrative rules promulgated under the Personnel Act. 
Specifically, Horn relies on section 67-19-18 of the Personnel 
Act, which states: 
Dismissals or demotions of career service employees 
shall only be to advance the good of the public 
interest, or for such just causes as inefficiency, 
incompetency, failure to maintain skills or adequate 
performance levels, insubordination, disloyalty to the 
orders of a superior, misfeasance, malfeasance, or 
nonfeasance in office. There shall be no dismissals 
for reasons of race, sex, age, physical handicap, 
national origin, religion, political affiliation, or 
other non-merit factor including the exercise of rights 
under this chapter. 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-18(1) (1986) (1991 & 1995 amendments made 
stylistic changes and substituted "service" for "interest"). 
Horn's reliance on the Personnel Act, and the corresponding 
administrative rules, to define his rights as a state employee 
establishes the fundamentally statutory nature of his claim 
against the Department. Indeed, Horn's contractual theory is 
inconsistent with the well-established principle that "the 
performance of a duty imposed by law is insufficient 
consideration to support a contract," Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 
764, 768 (Utah 1991) (holding buyers of savings and loan 
corporation failed to state a claim for breach of contract as a 
matter of law in alleging that state breached its promise to 
guarantee deposits in accordance with existing statutory 
10 
obligati : i i) 
In a case similar to this one, the Kansas Supreme Court 
rec, "• - - •" * "' *.-^ .:^ «^ ., nature of a civil servant's 
claim for wrongful : ..iiinatiOii. ±n Wright v. Kansas Water 
Office, 881 P.2d 567 (Kan. 1994/, a former «tate hydrologist 
alleged that the state water i^ep^ r^ m^ ^^  .4u~ .reacnej . . . _:. 
employren+" ^on^r2^*" - ^  terminating his employment Despite its 
acknowledgment. :;.a: t:*c :::. ai^-j-,-- / 
terminated, the Wright court reversed the trial court's decision 
grar.L-:.g ^^_^ i--j, - * -^ -cl - —-^ '• * t 
determined that the hydrologist!s claim was oarred because the 
statutory claims, ratner than tne rive-yea: period .c: claims for 
b r e a c 1 i : • f e ; :i : i t !:  J at573. Thecourtheld: 
We hold that the employment relationship between the 
State and Wright did not arise out of a written 
contract. Rather, the relationship is fixed by 
statute. The [Kansas Civil Service Act] controls a 
classified civil service employee's employment status. 
3Hom correctly notes that this is a case of first :l r ipression 
in Utah. Indeed, few cases directly on point exist in a.\y 
jurisdiction. One reason for this dearth is the exhaust: 
remedies requirement applicable to most wrongful terminate 
cases by civil servants. Indeed, He mfs failure to pursue his 
administrative remedies in this cas' = :i s an alternative ground for 
affirmance of the trial court's order dismissing Hom's state law 
claims. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-19a-101 to -408 (19 enacted 
by 1, §§ 6-21 and establishing Career 
Rev raj, and Dep't of Social Servs. v. Hiaas, 656 r. H,, 
100^
 x„, 1982) (upholding dismissal of state's appeal fr. .. 
administrative order sustaining employee grievances because state 
had failed to exhaus4" administrative procedures) . 
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The KCSA affords the right of continued employment in 
the absence of a legitimate cause for termination. The 
employment relationship of a classified employee to the 
State is one of statutory status. 
Id. at 571. 
In analyzing whether the hydrologistfs claim was contractual 
or statutory, the Wright court reviewed the state civil service 
act, which created a department of personnel management and 
authorized the director to make rules and regulations governing 
all aspects of state employment. Id. at 572. The court noted 
that although the hydrologist had identified a few personnel 
records as the alleged contract, "the focus of his claim is that 
as a classified civil service employee, he held a right not to be 
terminated without a hearing and without good cause." id. at 
573. Because the hydrologist "would not have had these rights 
but for the [civil service act]," the court held that his claim 
was statutory, rather than contractual. 
Like the civil service statute in Wright, the Personnel Act 
establishes a department of personnel management (the Utah State 
Division of Personnel Management, now the Department of Human 
Resource Management), and creates a comprehensive personnel 
management system that governs virtually every aspect of 
employment for most state employees. Like the hydrologist in 
Wright, Horn posits only the existence of a written, rather than 
an oral contract, and the focus of his wrongful termination claim 
is the just cause provision of the civil service statute. 
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Indeed, Horn is unable to identify any writing other than the 
support his contract theory. 4 Accordingly, ..ke rne 
h y di o 1 o g i s I:' ' s :: ] a :i rin :i i : Wi ial i I: ,. 1 1 • :: m' s 11: :: i I g f i :i 1 I: = :i : n i :i i : e I: i • : i I :: 1 e :i irt 
is statutory, rather than contractual. 
F v~ under the Personnel 
Act involve issues c: fundamental legislative concern, Like 
othei " " " -"stems, the Personnel Act advances the 
important public policy that "comparative merit or achievement 
govern the selection "^ advancement of employees i n Utah state 
government and that employees be rewarded for per fc rinai ice i i : E 
manner that will encourage excellence and strengthen the system" 
and of providing 
for equal employment opportunity by ensuring that all 
personnel actions including hire, tenure or term, 
condition or privilege of employment be based on t:._ 
ability to perform the duties and responsibilities 
assigned to a particular position without regard to 
age, race, creed or religion, color, handicap, sex, 
nationa 1 ori gi n a ncestry or political affiliation. 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-2 (3) & ( I I "86) (repealed effective May 
: .ee also ISA Am. Jur. 2d Civil Service § 1 (1976) 
4Althoug: L ai^uv. ^ a i uu*
 ttyd**wj employ ing a career 
service emplo^ nter into a contract with the employee that 
imposes obligations in addition to those imposed by Personnel Act 
and corresponding administrative rules (so long as the 
contractual obligations are consistent with the statutory 
duties), that is not the case here. In advancing his breach of 
contract claim against the Department, Horn relies solely on the 
theory that the Personnel Act and the corresponding 
adir-ini citrat-ive rules themselves formed a written contract. 
(discussing legislative purpose of civil service systems and 
stating that a primary goal is to enable governments "to render 
more efficient services to the public by enabling them to obtain 
efficient public servants"). The Personnel Act also charges the 
director to: 
develop and administer a program of personnel 
management which will: (a) aid in the efficient 
execution of public policy; (b) foster careers in 
public service for qualified employees; and (c) render 
assistance to state agencies in performing their 
missions . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-6(1) (1986). 
Rather than merely "flesh[ing] out" or "adding a layer of 
protection" to a fundamentally contractual relationship, the 
Personnel Act comprehensively defines the basic nature, terms and 
conditions of career service employment with the state. In so 
doing, it advances important public policy as determined by the 
legislature. Therefore, issues concerning the employment rights 
of a career service employee such as Horn are properly resolved 
under the principles of statutory interpretation, rather than 
contract law.5 
Furthermore, as noted by the Wright court, the conclusion 
that a civil servant's wrongful termination claim is statutory 
5Hom incorrectly asserts that before the enactment of the 
Personnel Act, the relationship between the state and its 
employees was contractual. The Personnel Act was preceded by the 
Merit Systems Act, Utah Code Ann. § 67-13-1 to -15, which was 





^ than contractual is consistent with the hold 3 ngs of courts 
in other jurisdictions, which "have reasoned that tl le ter ms ai id 
conditions of employment :i n the ci vil service are not determined 
b y a w r i 11 e n con t r a c t b e t w e e 1 1 11 1 e S t: 
the statutes and regulations of the appropriate agency or 
age:. _ ^  ^  . x ample, 
in Personnel Division of the Executive Department v. St. Clair/ 
4 98 l 2 1 8 DS ( :: •. • :: I i | -j - ] 9 ; 2) , I .1 .• 1 I rejected the claim 
of several state employees that a statu tor y amendment that 
1 e n g t h e n e d 1:1 1 • = t i m • =; b e f o r e a required sal a ry review violated the 
state constitutional provision against impairment 0: contracts. 
The court stated, 
Respondents' arguments concerni .. CJ;._ = . --1 
rights' and * impairment of the : _ ' j G . .n of 
contracts,' in which they en. r to apply the general 
law of contracts to the present e, are based on the 
erroneous assumption that th~ luyment relationship 
between the state of Oregon ts civil service 
employes [sic] arises out of, or results in, a contract 
between the parties. The terms and conditions of civil 
service employment are fixed by statute and the 
regulations of the state personnel aaencyf and not bv 
"contract'' between the public employer and the 
individual employee. 
Id. at 811. See also Miller v. State of California, 557 P.2d 
6As uuc Wngftt, ^v^ „ _i whether a state 
employee's wrongful tei ..on clain. . . statutory or contractual 
dees not often arise :n the context of a statute of limitations 
question because such claims are ordinarily subject to an 
exhaustion of remedies requirement. 881 P.2d at 573. 
previously noted, Horn's failure to exhaust his administrative 
remedies with the CSRB is an alternative ground for affirming the 
deci s i on below "-• — *- ~ 3 above, 
970, 973-76 (Cal. 1977) (holding reduction of mandatory 
retirement age for state employees did not impair vested 
contractual rights, stating, "it is well settled in California 
that public employment is not held by contract but by statute . . 
. . " ) ; Bowman v. Maine State Employees Appeals Board/ 408 A.2d 
688, 689-92 (Me. 1979) (rejecting claim of former state hospital 
doctor that statutory declassification of his civil service 
position violated contract clause of state and federal 
constitutions); Wage Appeal of Montana State Highway Patrol 
Officers v. Board of Personnel, 676 P.2d 194, 199 (Mont. 1984) 
(rejecting claim that new state pay plan decreasing salaries for 
highway patrol officers impaired the officers' contractual 
rights, recognizing that "when the Legislature enacts a statute 
fixing certain terms and conditions of public employment, such as 
salaries and compensation, it is presumed that the statute does 
not create contractual rights, but is intended merely to declare 
a policy to be pursued until the Legislature declares otherwise); 
Smith v. Citv of Newark, 320 A.2d 212, 219 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Law 
Div. 1974), reversed on other grounds 344 A.2d 782, 784 (N.J. 
Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1975) (rejecting impairment of contracts claim 
on ground that **the terms and conditions of public service in 
office or employment rest in legislative policy rather than 
contractual obligation, and hence may be changed except of course 
insofar as the State Constitution specifically provides otherwise 
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( " " ashincrton Federation of State Employees 
v. State of Wash-..^ , -.'-2 P.2d 8£^, b * kasn. 1984) (rejecting 
impairment of contracts claim, holding terrr^ and conditions cf 
puo-Lic employment are basics . -
contract = rhp abr,vp courts recognize, claims c: wrongful 
treaume: - _^ __ _. _ i. -t ^r- e 
statutes invoke strong public policy considerations and are 
fjmw. ^ . • I . 
The conclusion that such claims are properly characterized 
e i •.*. -- --
 ± a w interpreting 
the statute of jLimitcLiions 101 btatutoi^ '..aims. Utah Code 
sp>r- - 7fc-I2-2£' ^Lablishes a three-year limitations period 
for "an action iui - 1 lability createa ^
 w.._ iiatutes ol this 
state " r_ee Utah C e ^ Ann, <5 7fi-!?-?£ ~Q96^ M996 amendment 
made stylistic changes; .lerpre:.:^ -t _ _ ~ > 
have generally hp]d that limitations periods for statutory claims 
appl^ A:.e:e _;.•_ 1 
not have existed without the enactment of the statute. See 
Wria! i b a . Kansas . * ^  „^„,^ -_. ;ee 
also Kelly v. Primeline Advisory, i- ^o^ r.ziu ~ J -, ±OO ^an. 
3 995) (he ] d i ng state securities fraud s^atu^e created new 
substantive rights and lia. , . .ties : . *- .. „z tx- : ^ » 
common law fraud action and was therefore subject to the 
limitations period for liabilities created by statute, rather 
than the limitations period for common law fraud). 
Without the provisions of the Personnel Act, career service 
employees would be considered common law "at-will" employees, who 
generally may be fired for any reason, or for no reason at all. 
See Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1044 (Utah 
1989) (recognizing rebuttable presumption that employment having 
no specified duration may be terminated without just cause). 
Accordingly, the Personnel Act is the source of the substantive 
right on which Horn sues, and that right would not exist but for 
the Personnel Act. The just cause requirement which Horn seeks to 
enforce was created solely by statute and would not exist at all 
absent the statute. Therefore, Horn's claim is statutory, rather 
than contractual in nature. 
B. Cases Involving Governmental Employees Who Are 
Exempt from the Civil Service Statutes, or Vested 
Rights Are Inapposite to Horn's Wrongful 
Termination Claim 
None of the cases cited by Horn support the application of 
contract law to his wrongful termination claim. The Utah Supreme 
Court's decision in Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College, 
636 P.2d 1063 (Utah 1981) is inapplicable because it addressed 
the wrongful termination claim of an exempt college employee 
rather than a state career service employee such as Horn. In 
Piacitelli, the court upheld the trial court's determination that 
a college had substantially complied with the procedures required 
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by its personnel manual ^n declining ^n renew the contract of a 
non-tenure track counselor. 
decision that the personnel manual governing the counselor's 
e m p l o y m e n t " u o m p o i i i i i in i in I HI IIIIILJ I IJ . in MI I II I I I n i l 
educational institution may undertake a contractual obligation to 
obsei ' i | i i i II i i • • •"""" " ' " I i«' iiiop^-n^ rrocedures 
or by promulgating rules and regulations governing _/;e employment 
re 1 a 1:i onsh i j: » " inerefore, ti 1 e court stated that in 
addressing whether tne oux.cue had substantially c o m p ^ ^ u with 
the manual, "we are construing ? contract/ not declaring 
statutory or constitutional ^g;.Lw 
The application of ^ - f r a r f principles in Piacitelli fails 
to support ._ iiLjdL . n > 
employees are expressly exempt tr.r *ne previsions i "he 
Pel Sonne J h\, I " I 
"[T]he following positions •: J. r-t • xempt from tne career 
< ev* ~ " ~ P "" f a cu 1 f y and 
other employees of state universities duu ^  i.ti state 
j nsti tutions of higher education,. •-• -^ ^ £"?-] 9-1 ? {g) 
(] 986) According] ;  > the counselor n* r'laciteii^ iex.c. _.. ...: 
college's personnel manual, rather than the orovisions of the 
Personnel Act ::: i I t ii ii cl I I I ::: •iici ic: = ] ::l es 
rights. 
P.2d 1034 (Utah 1995) ("Thurston II"), support Horn's cause 
against the Department. In Thurston II, the court followed law 
of the case principles in upholding a trial court ruling that a 
county had terminated a county road worker in violation of the 
County Personnel Management Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 17-33-1 to -15 
(1987). Acknowledging that its decision in Thurston v. Box Elder 
County, 835 P.2d 165 (1992) ("Thurston I"), an earlier appeal in 
the same case, had "overstated the applicability of the [County 
Personnel Management] Act to the County's personnel policies and 
procedures," the court declined to remand the case for a 
consideration of the evidence showing that the statute did not 
apply to the county because it had too few employees. Instead, 
the court determined that the county personnel manual should be 
interpreted to comport with the court's interpretation of the 
statute from which the manual's language had been borrowed. Id. 
at 1039. Accordingly, the trial court's determination that the 
county worker had been wrongfully terminated was correct, under 
either the statute or the manual. 
Horn inaccurately characterizes the Thurston II decision as 
recognizing that the "nature of the relationship between a public 
employee and his employer is contractual; not statutory." 
Opening Brief of Appellant Horn, at 29. More accurately, the 
court in Thurston II determined that it was unnecessary to decide 
whether the statute applied because the terms of the statute and 
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the personnel manual were the same, and the result would be the 
same under either theory. 
Indeed, the court's analysis in Thurston I soundly refutes 
Horn's theory that a wrongful termination claim by a career 
service employee is contractual rather than statutory. Based on 
the assumption (cast in doubt on the second appeal), that the 
County Personnel Management Act governed the county worker's 
employment, the court stated that the parties "have inaccurately 
formulated the issues" in casting the case as a breach of 
contract action based on the county's personnel manual. 835 P.2d 
at 168. Although the parties had not addressed the County 
Personnel Management Act, the court felt compelled to consider 
the effect of the statute sua sponte "because it is controlling 
and it would be contrary to public policy to decline to do so." 
Id. at 168 n.3. The court went on to reject the county's 
argument that it properly terminated the worker because the 
personnel manual required consideration of only two of the three 
factors enumerated in the statute, stating, "Clearly the County 
was not authorized to adopt a standard different from that found 
in the statute." Id. at 168. The court further held that in 
terminating the worker the county had improperly considered 
additional factors not enumerated in the statute, stating that 
the purpose of the statute "is to set a standard which county 
employers must follow and upon which employees can rely . . . . 
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Given this purpose, we hold that the statute precluded 
consideration of factors not enumerated." Id. 
Assuming that the County Personnel Management Act was 
applicable, the Thurston I court plainly viewed the county 
worker's wrongful termination claim as statutory, rather than 
contractual. In this case, no doubt exists that the Personnel 
Act governs Horn's claim. Indeed, Horn expressly relies on the 
Personnel Act and the administrative rules promulgated under the 
Act as the basis of his claim. As Thurston I demonstrates, a 
wrongful termination claim under a civil service statute requires 
consideration of the strong public policies advanced by the 
statute. Accordingly, such a claim is fundamentally statutory, 
rather than contractual in nature. 
Horn correctly points out that Utah courts, like many other 
jurisdictions, treat vested public retirement benefits as 
contractual obligations, but that narrow proposition fails to 
support his assertion that the entire employment relationship is 
contractual. See, e.g., Ellis v. Utah State Retirement Board, 
757 P.2d 882, 886 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (holding city attorney was 
not deprived of vested contractual benefits when he failed to 
satisfy conditions precedent to disability retirement benefits 
because he did not become disabled or retired before the 
legislature modified Disability Act). Vested retirement and 
similar employment benefits represent deferred compensation for 
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services that have already been provided, and are therefore 
deemed contractual. Unlike an employee who has satisfied all the 
requirements for the payment of a retirement benefit by providing 
the required years of service and making the required 
contributions, Hom has no vested right in continued civil service 
employment. 
Several courts have explained the distinction. For example, 
in Miller v. State, 557 P.2d 970 (Cal. 1977), the California 
Supreme Court reasoned: 
Plaintiff's reliance upon decisions concerning the 
pension rights of public employees is misplaced . . . . 
Pension rights, unlike tenure of civil service 
employment, are deferred compensation earned 
immediately upon the performance of services for a 
public employer "and cannot be destroyed . . . without 
impairing a contractual obligation. Thus the courts of 
this state have refused to hold, in the absence of 
special provision, that public employment establishes 
tenure rights, but have uniformly held that pension 
laws . . . establish contractual rights." 
Id. at 973 (rejecting state employee's claim that legislation 
reducing the age of mandatory retirement impaired his contractual 
rights). Similarly, agreeing that state civil service laws do 
not create a contract between the state and its employees, the 
Washington Supreme Court stated: 
We adopt the [state's] position as the correct 
statement of the law. The rights challenged here are 
neither deferred benefits nor do they give rise to 
contractual expectancies. Rather, the affected 
provisions (certification, increment salary increases, 
layoffs, and reemployment from layoffs) are best 
categorized as terms of public employment (tenure) and 
part of a system of personnel administration. Tenure 
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is regulated by legislative policy. 
Washington Federation of State Employees v. State of Washington, 
682 P.2d 869, 872 (Wash. 1984) (holding amendments to civil 
service statute did not impair state employees contractual 
rights). 
In the same vein, the Maine Supreme Court rejected the claim 
of a state hospital doctor that the statutory declassification of 
his position impairs his contractual rights, stating, "It must be 
remembered that we are not concerned with Dr. Bowman's right to 
whatever emoluments he may be entitled to as a result of his 
years of service. We are concerned only with his right to 
continue in his position as Superintendent of Pineland." Bowman 
v. Maine State Employees Appeal Bd., 408 A.2d 688, 691 (Me. 
1979). Similarly, the trial court was concerned only with Horn's 
right to continued employment with the Department, not with his 
retirement or other state benefits, and therefore correctly held 
that Hom failed to state a claim for breach of contract.7 
7Hom points to occasional references in the administrative 
rules of the Department of Human Resource Management to 
"agreements" or "contracts" with employees concerning matters 
such as telecommuting and overtime payment options to support his 
contention that his relationship with the defendant Department 
was contractual. Opening Brf. of Hom at 27, referring to R. at 
620. This analysis has several flaws. First, the rules to which 
Hom points were not adopted in 1992, well after Horn's employment 
was terminated in March 1990. Second, none of the identified 
rules concern grounds for termination of employment. Third, some 
of the rules apply to exempt employees, rather than career 
service employees. 
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C. No Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Existed 
Between Horn and the Department 
Horn's allegation of breach of an implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing adds nothing to his wrongful termination 
claim against the Department. As discussed above, Horn had no 
employment contract with the Department, and therefore no 
contract into which such a covenant may be implied. In addition, 
the alleged obligation of good faith and fair dealing simply 
restates the obligation already imposed on the Department by the 
Personnel Act and corresponding administrative rules. Moreover, 
like his contract claim, Horn's breach of the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing is barred for failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies. See note 3 above. As stated by the 
court in Valenzuela v. State, 240 Cal. Rptr. 45, 48 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1987), "We hold Valenzuela's claim for a breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing simply restates 
the obligation of the State to deal fairly and in good faith with 
its employees as required by statute and administrative rules, 
and remedies for breach of that obligation are in the 
administrative procedures provided by the State civil service 
system, [the employee plaintiff's] exclusive remedy as a State 
civil service employee.fl8 
8Because Horn asserts only the existence of an express 
written contract, his citation of a series of Michigan cases 
grappling inconclusively with the issue of whether a public 
employer may create an implied-in-fact contract is inapposite. 
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D. Conclusion 
In sum, Horn relies exclusively on the Personnel Act and its 
corresponding administrative rules in advancing his claim that 
the Department wrongfully terminated his employment. His claim 
necessarily involves the interpretation and application of 
statutory law. The cases on which Horn relies are inapposite 
because they involve vested rights or governmental employees who 
are exempt or otherwise not covered by civil service statutes. 
Horn failed to commence his wrongful termination claim within the 
three-year period allowed for statutory claims. Accordingly, the 
trial court correctly held that Horn failed to state a claim for 
breach of a written contract against the Department, and this 
Court should affirm the trial court's dismissal of Horn's breach 
of contract claim.9 
See Bennett v. Marshall Public Library, 746 F. Supp. 671 (W.D. 
Mich. 1990); Merrell v. Bav County Metropolitan Trans. Auth., 707 
F. Supp. 289 (E.D. Mich. 1989); Thorin v. Bloomfield Hills Board 
of Education, 513 N.W.2d 230 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994); Manning v. 
Citv of Hazel Park, 509 N.W. 2d 874 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994). 
9The dismissal of Horn's claim may also be affirmed on the 
alternative ground that it is barred by the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act. Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-1 to -38 (1993 & Supp. 
1997). First, Horn never filed a notice of claim describing the 
nature of his claims as statutory as required by section 63-30-
11(3) (a) (ii). R. 1087-90. See Yearslev v. Jensen, 798 P.2d 1127 
(Utah 1990) (notice of claim for physical and emotional distress 
from alleged assault and battery insufficient to preserve claim 
for malicious prosecution). Second, although the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act waives immunity for contractual 
obligations, no such waiver applies to Horn's statutory claim. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3(1) (1993) (retaining immunity except 
as expressly provided in statute). 
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Point II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED HOM'S 
FEDERAL DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION CLAIM AS 
BARRED BY THE FOUR-YEAR STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS 
This Court should affirm the dismissal of Horn's federal 
disability discrimination claim against the Defendants because 
the applicable four-year limitations period had expired when Horn 
filed his initial complaint in this case, and because no 
circumstances exist to warrant application of the discovery rule. 
Disability discrimination claims under section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act are subject to the limitations period for 
personal injury claims under state law. See Baker v. Board of 
Regents of State of Kansas, 991 F.2d 628, 631-32 (10th Cir. 
1993). Accordingly, the four-year limitations period for 
personal injury claims in Utah applies to Horn's disability 
discrimination claim under section 504. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-12-25(3) (1996) (1996 amendment made stylistic changes). 
Under the ordinary rule that a personal injury action 
accrues when the injury occurs, Horn's disability discrimination 
claim accrued, at the very latest, on the date his employment was 
terminated on March 1, 1990. See Jepson v. State, 846 P.2d 485, 
468 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Horn's amended complaint in which he 
27 
first asserted his disability discrimination claim in this case 
and which was filed on March 6, 1995, was filed too late. Even 
assuming, however, that Horn's amended complaint related-back to 
March 24, 1994, when he filed his original complaint in this 
case, Horn's disability discrimination claim was untimely and is 
therefore barred.10 
Horn's alleged unawareness until August 1994 that several 
Department employees believed that he was emotionally or mentally 
unstable does not support the application of the discovery rule 
to toll the limitations period for his disability discrimination 
claim. Generally, "simple ignorance or obliviousness to the 
existence of a cause of action will not prevent the running of 
the statute of limitations." Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 
Inc., 920 P.2d 575, 578 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Rather, the 
discovery rule applies in three situations: 
(1) in situations where the discovery rule is mandated 
by statute; (2) in situations where a plaintiff does 
not become aware of the cause of action because of the 
10The federal court denied Horn leave to file an amended 
complaint to allege a disability discrimination claim because the 
proposed amendment was untimely and prejudicial, and because the 
statute of limitations had expired and the claim did not relate-
back to the filing of his original federal complaint. R. 418. 
That decision was affirmed by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
on the ground of untimeliness alone, without reaching the 
relation-back issue. See Horn v. Squire. 81 F.3d 969 (10th Cir. 
1996). Accordingly, Horn's relation-back argument is precluded 
under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Because Horn's claim 
is barred by the statute of limitations in any event, however, 
this Court need not reach the collateral estoppel or relation-
back issue. 
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defendant's concealment or misleading conduct; and (3) 
in situations where the case presents exceptional 
circumstances and the application of the general rule 
would be irrational or unjust, regardless of any 
showing that the defendant has prevented the discovery 
of the cause of action. 
Id. 
Contrary to Horn's contention, neither the fraudulent 
concealment nor the exceptional circumstances versions of the 
discovery rule applies here because Horn has failed to make the 
required threshold showing that he did not know and could not 
reasonably have discovered the facts underlying his disability 
discrimination claim in time to bring an action. See Walker Drug 
Co. v. La Sal Oil Co., 902 P.2d 1229, 1231-32 (Utah 1995). 
Ordinarily, lfl[a]ll that is required [to trigger the statute of 
limitations] is . . . sufficient information to apprise [the 
plaintiffs of the underlying cause of action] so as to put them 
on notice to make further inquiry if they harbor doubts or 
questions" about the defendant's actions.f" Berenda v. Lanaford, 
914 P.2d 45, 51 (Utah 1996) (quoting United Park Citv Mines Co. 
v. Greater Park City Co., 870 P.2d 880, 889 (Utah 1993)) 
(modifications in original). 
Horn has failed to show that he had insufficient information 
to put him on notice to make further inquiry about the 
perceptions of his behavior. Horn's disability discrimination 
claim is based on the allegation that in terminating his 
employment, the Defendants discriminated against him because they 
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perceived that he was mentally unstable. Horn contends that he 
was unaware of the Defendants' alleged perception until August 
1994 when he deposed several Department employees in his federal 
action and, in response to questioning, they revealed their 
perceptions of Horn's emotional state and behavior. 
Even under Horn's version of the facts, the events leading up 
to Horn's involuntary termination and the stated reasons for that 
termination gave Horn ample notice of the possibility that the 
Defendants regarded him as mentally unstable. For example, Horn 
reports experiencing deteriorating relationships with his co-
workers, Opening Brief of Appellant Horn at 11, being the subject 
of an internal affairs investigation, id. at 12, experiencing 
extreme stress and pressure from being overworked, .id. at 13, 
being banned from the third floor of his building where the 
Driver's License Division was located, id. at 14, having his 
supervisor tape record his conversations with Horn, id. at 19, 
having his security clearance revoked, id. at 20, and breaking 
down and crying uncontrollably during a meeting with the chief of 
the Bureau of Criminal Investigations. Ld. These circumstances 
strongly suggest that Department employees believed Horn was 
unstable. Indeed, awareness of these facts probably prompted 
Horn's attorney to probe the topic of the employees' perceptions 
of Horn's emotional and mental state at their depositions. 
Moreover, the stated reasons for Horn's involuntary 
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termination—that Horn was perceived to be a security threat, that 
he had committed perjury, and that he had been insubordinate— 
also strongly suggest that the Defendants believed Horn to be 
mentally disturbed or unstable, and placed Horn on notice to 
inquire further. Thus, Horn failed to show that he had 
insufficient information to put him on notice to make further 
inquiry. 
In addition, Horn failed to establish a prima facie case that 
the Defendants fraudulently concealed Horn's claim. When a 
plaintiff alleges that a defendant "took affirmative steps to 
conceal" the cause of action, the "plaintiff can avoid the full 
operation of the discovery rule by making a prima facie showing 
of fraudulent concealment and then demonstrating that given the 
defendant's actions, a reasonable plaintiff would not have 
discovered the claim earlier." Berenda v. Lancrford, 914. P.2d 45, 
51 (Utah 1996). The fact that the Defendants may have believed 
that Horn was mentally unstable does not, as Horn suggests, 
automatically establish that the Defendants involuntarily 
terminated Horn's employment because of his mental instability.11 
nUnder the American With Disabilities Act, the successor 
statute to the Rehabilitation Act, an employer "must tolerate 
eccentric or unusual conduct caused by an employee's disability 
so long as the employee can satisfactorily perform the essential 
functions of his job," Hartoa v. Wasatch Academy, 1997 LEXIS 
29792 *39 (10th Cir. as corrected December 15, 1997). However, 
"an employer may take action against an employee who poses a 
'direct threat' to the health or safety of other individuals in 
the workplace." Id* at *35. Thus, an employer may be required 
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Thus, contrary to Horn's suggestion, the Defendants1 consistent 
position in their discovery responses that they terminated Horn 
because of insubordination, perjury, and threats to state 
security, does not constitute fraudulent concealment of the 
factual basis for Horn's disability discrimination claim. 
Moreover, even if Horn had established a prima facie case of 
fraudulent concealment, it is apparent that Horn could easily have 
discovered earlier the Defendants' perception of his mental state 
simply by diligently pursuing his claims, either before the CSRB 
or the federal district court. To take advantage of the 
discovery rule, a plaintiff who has established a prima facie 
case of fraudulent concealment must still demonstrate that "given 
the defendant's actions, a reasonable plaintiff would not have 
discovered the claim earlier." Berenda, 914 P.2d at 51. 
Although such an inquiry is normally a question of fact, summary 
judgment is proper "when the facts are so clear that reasonable 
persons could not disagree about the underlying facts or about 
the application of the governing legal standard to the facts." 
Id. at 54. 
As both the federal district court and court of appeals made 
clear, Horn was far from diligent in pursuing his claims either in 
tc relax workplace rules concerning neatness or courtesy where a 
mentally disabled employee's job does not involve interaction 
with others, but may uniformly enforce rules prohibiting violence 
or the threat of violence in the workplace, regardless of whether 
such behavior is caused by a mental disability. 
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the CSRB or in federal court. R. 403-05 (Addendum B) and Horn v. 
Sauire, 81 F.3d 969, 973 (10th Cir. 1996). Moreover, when Horn 
finally deposed several Department employees in August 1994—over 
four years after Horn was terminated and nearly three years after 
he commenced his federal action—they freely revealed their 
perceptions of Horn's mental instability, despite the continued 
threat of liability from Horn's claims. Contrary to Horn's 
suggestion, witnesses who testify truthfully under the threat of 
litigation are not necessarily "foolish," and fraudulent 
concealment may not reasonably be inferred from the existence of 
such a threat alone. Accordingly, the trial court properly 
granted summary judgment against Horn on the ground that 
reasonable persons could not disagree that given the Defendants' 
conduct, Horn's alleged failure to discover his cause of action 
was unreasonable. 
Finally, Horn's allegation that the concealment exception 
applies here should also be rejected on the ground that "*the 
facts underlying the allegation of fraudulent concealment are so 
tenuous, vague, or insufficiently established that they fail to 
raise a genuine issue of material fact as to concealment.'" Id.; 
see also Anderson, 920 P.2d at 580. Horn has failed to set forth 
anything more than vague innuendo in support of his allegations 
of fraudulent concealment. Accordingly, the trial court properly 
granted summary judgment to the Defendants on the ground that the 
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limitations period had run on Horn's disability discrimination 
claim.12 
CONCLUSION 
Hom failed to commence his suit against the Defendants 
within the limitation periods applicable to his claims. Hom had 
no written employment contract with the Department, and his claim 
is properly characterized as statutory, rather than contractual. 
The discovery rule does not apply to his federal disability 
discrimination claim. The trial court properly granted summary 
judgment against Horn, and this Court should affirm the judgment 
of dismissal in its entirety. 
l/dfc 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this (({/ day of January, 1998. 
1 - • . 
kh>'\~- ttwi. 
DEBRA J. (^ lOORE 
Attorney for Appellees 
12Because the limitations period clearly barred Horn's claim, 
this Court need not address Horn's arguments that the decision in 
his federal case did not collaterally estop him from claiming 
that his amended complaint in this case related-back to his 
original complaint, and that he stated a proper disability 
discrimination claim. 
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ADDENDUM A 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-19-2 (1986) 
67-19-2. Policy of state. 
(1) It is the policy of this state that the governor be responsible for the 
administration of the personnel system and that the governor direct the sys-
tem in a manner that will provide for the effective implementation of the 
policies and programs under the governor's direction. 
(2) It is the policy of this state that the Utah state personnel system be 
administered on behalf of the governor by a strong central personnel agency. 
Any delegation of personnel functions should be according to standards and 
guidelines determined by the central personnel agency and should be care-
fully monitored by it. 
(3) It is the policy of this state that comparative merit or achievement 
govern the selection and advancement of employees in Utah state government 
and that employees be rewarded for performance in a manner that will en-
courage excellence and strengthen the system. 
(4) It is the policy of this state to provide for equal employment opportunity 
by ensuring that all personnel actions including hire, tenure or term, and 
condition or privilege of employment be based on the ability to perform the 
duties and responsibilities assigned to a particular position without regard to 
age, race, creed or religion, color, handicap, sex, national origin, ancestry or 
political affiliation. 
(5) It is the policy of this state, if there are substantial disparities between 
the proportions of members of racial, ethnic, gender or handicap groups in 
state employment and the proportions of such groups in the labor force in this 
state, to take affirmative action to ensure that members of the groups have 
the opportunity to apply and be considered for available positions in state 
government. 
(6) It is the policy of this state to ensure its employees opportunities for 
satisfying careers and fair treatment based on the value of each employee's 
services. 
(7) It is the policy of this state to provide a formal procedure for processing 
the appeals and grievances of state employees without discrimination, coer-
cion, restraint or reprisal. 
History: C. 1953, 67-19-2, enacted by L. 
1979, ch. 139, * S. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-19-15 (1986) 
67-19-15. Coverage of career service provisions. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided by law or by rules and regulations promul-
gated for federally aided programs, the following positions shall be exempt 
from the career service provisions of this chapter: 
(a) the governor, members of the Legislature, and all other elected 
state officers; 
(b) persons appointed to fill vacancies in elective positions, employees 
of the state Legislature, employees of the state judiciary, members of 
boards and commissions, and heads of departments appointed by the gov-
ernor, state and local officials serving ex officio, and members of state and 
local boards and councils appointed by the governing bodies of the depart-
ments; 
(c) all employees and officers in the office and at the residence of the 
governor; 
(d) those employees who make final policy decisions, including all 
heads of departments, agencies, and major offices; those heads of subordi-
nate units whose duties have a direct and substantial effect on the public 
relations of state administration generally; those employees whose regu-
lar duties include public advocacy and defense of administration policy; 
and those in a personal and confidential relationship to elected officials 
and to heads of departments, agencies, and other major offices. All posi-
tions designated as being exempt under this subsection shall be listed in 
the rules promulgated under this act by the job title and department or 
agency and any change in exempt status shall constitute an amendment 
to the rules; 
(e) unskilled employees in positions requiring little or no specialized 
skill or training. A roster of all such positions showing job title, number of 
positions, and department or agency shall be maintained by the director 
of personnel management on a current basis and the roster shall be avail-
able for public review; 
(f) part-time professional noncareer persons, who are paid for any form 
of medical and other professional service, and who are not engaged in the 
performance of administrative duties; 
(g) officers, faculty, and other employees of state universities and other 
state institutions of higher education; 
(h) teaching staff of all state institutions, and patients and inmates 
employed in state institutions; 
(i) persons employed in a professional or scientific capacity to make or 
conduct a temporary and special inquiry, investigation, or examination 
on behalf of the Legislature or a legislative committee or by authority of 
the governor; 
0') noncareer employees compensated for their services on a seasonal or 
contractual basis who are hired for limited periods of less than nine con-
secutive months, or who are employed on less than one-half time basis; 
and 
(k) all employees of the Utah Housing Finance Agency. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-19-15 (1986) 
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(2) The civil service shall consist of two schedules, as follows: 
(a) schedule A — The exempted schedule made under Subsection (1). 
Removal from any appointive position under schedule A, unless otherwise 
regulated by law, shall be at the pleasure of the appointing officers with-
out regard to tenure; and 
(b) schedule B — The competitive career service schedule, consisting of 
all positions filled through competitive selection procedures as defined by 
the director. 
(3) The director, after consultation with the heads of concerned depart-
ments and agencies, and with the approval of the governor, shall allocate 
positions to the appropriate schedules under this section. 
(4) Requests to change the schedule assignment and tenure rights of any 
position shall be made by an agency head to the director, whose decision shall 
be final, subject only to the governor's review in cases of denial of an agency's 
request by the director. 
(5) All employees of the office of lieutenant governor, the office of state 
auditor, the office of state treasurer, the attorney general's office, excluding 
attorneys who are under their own career service system, and employees who 
are not exempt under this section shall be covered by the career service provi-
sions of this chapter. 
History: C. 1953, 67-19-15, enacted by L. 
1979, ch. 139, § 21; L. 1983, ch. 332, fi 7; 
1985, ch. 203, i 11; 1985 (1st S.S.), ch. 4, 
i 18. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1983 amend-
ment reduced the number of schedules from 
three to two in Subsection (2); substituted "se-
lection procedures as defined by the director" 
for "examination, written or unwritten, and to 
which tenure shall apply following a proba-
tionary period, subject to the availability of 
funds and continued need for the position" in 
-Subsection (2Kb); deleted Subsection (2)(c) con-
cerning the noncompetitive schedule; deleted 
"of personnel management** after "director" in 
Subsection (3); substituted "lieutenant gover-
nor" for "secretary of state" in Subsection (5); 
and made minor changes in phraseology and 
punctuation. 
The 1985 amendment by ch. 203 deleted 
"and regulations" after "rules" in two places in 
the last sentence of Subsection (IKd); inserted 
"who are under their own career service sys-
tem" in Subsection (5); and made minor 
changes in phraseology. 
The 1985 (1st S.S.) amendment substituted 
"chapter" for "act" in Subsection (1); inserted 
Subsection (l)(k); substituted "chapter" for 
"act" in Subsection (5); and made minor 
changes in phraseology and punctuation. 
Meaning of "this act". — See note under 
same catchline following I 67-19-11. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-19-18 (1986) 
67-19-18. Dismissals and demotions — Grounds — Disci-
plinary action — Procedure — Reductions in 
force. 
(1) Dismissals or demotions of career service employees shall only be to 
advance the good of the public interest, and for such just causes as ineffi-
ciency, incompetency, failure to maintain skills or adequate performance 
levels, insubordination, disloyalty to the orders of a superior, misfeasance, 
malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office. There shall be no dismissal for reasons 
of race, sex, age, physical handicap, national origin, religion, political affilia-
tion, or other non-merit factor including the exercise of rights under this 
chapter. The director shall promulgate rules governing the procedural and 
documentary requirements of disciplinary dismissals and demotions. 
(2) If an agency head finds that a career service employee is charged with 
aggravated misconduct or that retention of a career service employee would 
endanger the peace and safety of others or pose a grave threat to the public 
interest, the employee may be suspended pending the administrative appeal 
to the department head as provided in Subsection (3). 
(3) No person shall be demoted or dismissed from a career service position 
unless the department head or designated representative has observed the 
following procedures: 
(a) The department head or designated representative notifies the em-
ployee in writing of the reasons for the dismissal or demotion; 
(b) The employee has no less than five working days to reply and have 
the reply considered by the department head; 
(c) The employee has an opportunity to be heard by the department 
head or designated representative; and 
(d) Following the hearing an employee may be dismissed or demoted if 
the department head finds adequate cause or reason. 
(4) Reductions in force required by inadequate funds, change of workload, 
or lack of work shall be governed by retention rosters established by the 
director. Under such circumstances: 
(a) The agency head shall designate the category of work to be elimi-
nated, subject to review by the director; 
(b) Temporary and probationary workers shall be separated before any 
tenured employee; 
(c) Retention points for each tenured employee shall be computed ac-
cording to rules promulgated by the director allowing appropriate consid-
eration for proficiency and for seniority in state government, including 
any active duty military service fulfilled subsequent to original state 
appointment. Tenured employees shall be separated in the order of their 
retention points, the employee with the lowest points to be discharged 
first; and 
(d) A career service employee who is separated in a reduction in force 
shall be placed on the reappointment roster provided for in Subsection 
67-19-17(2), and shall be reappointed without examination to any va-
UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-19-18 (1986) 
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cancy for which the employee is qualified which occurs within one year of 
the date of the separation. 
(e) An employee separated due to a reduction in force may appeal to the 
department head for an administrative review. The notice of appeal must 
be submitted within 20 working days after the employee's receipt of writ-
ten notification of separation. The employee may appeal the decision of 
the department head according to the grievance and appeals procedure of 
this act. 
History: C. 1953, 67-lft-18, enacted by L. 
1979, ch. 139, | 24; L. 1983, ch. 332, § 9. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1983 amend-
ment deleted "where funds have expired or 
work no longer exists" in the first sentence of 
Subsection (1); deleted "of personnel" after "di-
rector" in the last sentence of Subsection (1); 
deleted "of personnel management" after "di-
rector" in Subsection (4); added Subsection 
(4)(e); and made minor changes in phraseology 
and punctuation. 
Meaning of nthis act". — The term "this 
act," referred to in the last sentence in Subsec-
tion (4)(e), literally means Laws 1983, ch. 332, 
§§ 1 to 9, which appear as various sections 
throughout this chapter (see Table of Session 
Laws in Parallel Tables volume). However, 
given the context in which it is used, it seems 
that the term is meant to refer to Laws 1979, 
ch. 139, §§ 1 to 35. See note under same catch-
line following f 67-19-11. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25(3) (1996) 
78-12-25. Within four years. 
An action may be brought within four years: 
(1) upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon an instru-
ment in writing; also on an open account for goods, wares, and merchan-
dise, and for any article charged on a store account; also on an open 
account for work, labor or services rendered, or materials furnished; 
provided, that action in all of the foregoing cases may be commenced at 
any time within four years after the last charge is made or the last 
payment is received; 
(2) for a claim for relief or a cause of action under the following sections 
of Title 25, Chapter 6, Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act: 
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(a), which in specific situations limits the 
time for action to one year, under Section 25-6-10; 
(b) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b); or 
(c) Subsection 25-6-6(1); 
(3) for relief not otherwise provided for by law. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 68, { 1; C. 1943, tion" at the beginning of Subsections (1) and (3); 
Supp., 104-12-25; L. 1988, ch. 59, § 14; 1996, and made stylistic changes. 
ch. 79, § 110. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend-
ment, effective April 29, 1996, in the introduc-
tory paragraph, substituted "An action may be 
brought within'* for 'Within"; deleted "An ac-
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-26(4) (1996) 
78-12*26. Within three years. 
An action may be brought within three years: 
(1) for waste, or trespass upon or injury to real property; except that 
when waste or trespass is committed by means of underground works 
upon any mining claim, the cause of action does not accrue until the 
discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting such waste or 
trespass; 
(2) for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, including ac-
tions for specific recovery thereof; except that in all cases where the 
subject of the action is a domestic animal usually included in the term 
"livestock,* which at the time of its loss has a recorded mark or brand, if 
the animal strayed or was stolen from the true owner without the owner's 
fault, the cause does not accrue until the owner has actual knowledge of 
such facts as would put a reasonable man upon inquiry as to the 
possession of the animal by the defendant; 
(3) for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake; except that the cause of 
action in such case does not accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved 
party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake; 
(4) for a liability created by the statutes of this state, other than for a 
penalty or forfeiture under the laws of this state, except where in special 
cases a different limitation is prescribed by the statutes of this state; 
(5) to enforce liability imposed by Section 78-17-3, except that the cause 
of action does not accrue until the aggrieved party knows or reasonably 
should know of the harm suffered. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 68, { 1; a 1943, 
8uppM 104-12-26; L. 1986, ch. 143, ft 1; 1996, 
eh. 79, ft 111. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend-
ment, effective April 29,1996, in the introduc-
tory paragraph, substituted "An action may be 
Brought within* for •Within"; deleted *An ac-
tion" at the beginning of Subsections (1) to (5); 
and made stylistic changes. 
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A. Roland Squire, Arthur J. 
Hudachko, Douglas Bodrero, and 
John Does 1-10. ; 
Defendants. : 
: MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
Case No. 91-C-1016W 
This matter is before the court on Defendants A. Roland 
Squire ("Squire"), Arthur J. Hudachko, and Douglas Bodrero's 
("Bodrero") (collectively "defendants") Motion for Summary 
Judgment.1 A hearing on the motion was held on November 22, 
1994. The defendants were represented by J. Mark Ward. 
Plaintiff Michael Hom ("Horn") was represented by L. Zane Gill 
("Gill"). Before the hearing, the court considered carefully the 
memoranda and other materials submitted by the parties. Since 
taking the matter under advisement, the court has further 
considered the law and facts relating to the Motion for Summary 
1
 Defendants were employees of the Utah Department of 
Public Safety at times relevant to the facts alleged in the 
complaint. 
Judgment. Now being fully advised, the court renders the 
following Memorandum Decision and Order. 
I. BACKGROUND 
This action arose out of the termination of Horn's 
employment with the Utah Department of Public Safety ("DPS"), 
where he worked as a computer programmer/analyst. DPS terminated 
Horn for three enumerated reasons: (1) insubordination; (2) 
perjury; and (3) making threats against, and thus becoming a 
perceived security risk to, DPS's law enforcement related 
computer files. In his complaint, Horn alleges these are not the 
true reasons he was fired. Instead, he asserts he was terminated 
in retaliation for speaking out on certain matters. 
Specifically, he alleges this occurred "because of his vocalized 
and written concerns about the [DPS computer vendor] selection 
committee practices, compensation time violations and his 
grieving . . . letters of reprimand issued to him." (Am. Compl. 
% 82.) Horn also alleges the defendants deprived him of a liberty 
interest without due process of law. Specifically, he alleges 
DPS employees informed personnel at two other government agencies 
of the problems they perceived with Horn without affording him a 
constitutionally adequate opportunity to clear his name. 
2 
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The defendants have moved for summary judgment, arguing 
that Horn was not terminated for speaking out on the above 
matters, and that in any event such speech is not protected under 
the First Amendment- The defendants also argue that Horn had a 
constitutionally sufficient opportunity to clear his name. In 
response, Horn maintains that there are disputed issues of 
material fact that preclude this court from granting the 
defendants' motion on both issues. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(c). In applying this standard, the court must construe all 
facts and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 
Zenith Radio Corp.. 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Wright v. 
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.. 925 F.2d 1288, 1292 (10th Cir. 1991). 
Once the moving party has carried its burden, Rule 
56(e) "requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings 
and by . . . affidavits, or by the "depositions, answers to 
3 
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interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate "specific 
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex 
Corp. v. Catrett. 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986); Gonzales v. Millers 
Casualty Ins. Co., 923 F.2d 1417, 1419 (10th Cir. 1991) .2 The 
nonmoving party must "make a showing sufficient to establish the 
existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on 
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." 
Celotex Corp.. 477 U.S. at 322. 
In considering whether there exist genuine issues of 
material fact, the court does not weigh the evidence but instead 
inquires whether a reasonable jury, faced with the evidence 
presented, could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.. 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); 
Clifton v. Craig. 924 F.2d 182, 183 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 
112 S. Ct. 97 (1991).3 Finally, all material facts asserted by 
the moving party shall be deemed admitted unless specifically 
controverted by the opposing party. D. Utah R. 202(b) (4) . 
2
 The summary judgment motion may be "opposed by any of 
the kinds of evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), except 
the mere pleadings themselves." Celotex Corp. 477 U.S. at 324. 
3
 "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in 
support of the [nonmoving party's] position will be 




"[lit has been settled that a State cannot condition 
public employment on a basis that infringes the employee's 
constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression.11 
Connick v. Mvers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983) . In vindicating 
public employees' free speech rights, the Supreme Court has 
sought to balance "'the interests of the [employee], as a 
citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the 
interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the 
efficiency of the public services it performs through its 
employees.'" Id. (quoting Pickering v. Board of Education. 391 
U.S. 563, 568 (1968)). Absent unusual circumstances, the Court 
has indicated that when employee expression is not on a matter of 
public concern, "government officials should enjoy wide latitude 
in managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the 
judiciary in the name of the First Amendment." Id. at 147. 
The parties dispute whether Horn's speech involved 
matters of public concern. Employee expression involves a matter 
of public concern if it can "be fairly considered as relating to 
any matter of political, social, or other concern to the 
community." Id. at 146. Horn asserts he was terminated in 
retaliation for written and oral statements concerning his 
5 
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compensation time, his grievances, and the DPS computer vendor 
selection committee practices. 
The first two items do not involve matters of public 
concern, but rather involve matters of personal interest and the 
internal affairs of DPS. Thus, they are not protected by the 
First Amendment. See, e.g., Save v. St. Vrain Valley School 
Dist. RE-1J. 785 F.2d 862, 866 (10th Cir. 1986) (teacher's 
complaint that school district cut back on aide time did not go 
to aide time allocated generally, but only that allocated to her 
and thus did not address a matter of public concern); Sipes v. 
United States, 744 F.2d 1418, 1423 (10th Cir. 1984) (Air Force 
employee's statement that he was cited for infractions, while 
others committing the same infractions were not cited, involved 
personnel actions affecting only his own employment and therefore 
did not touch on matters of public concern); Schmidt v. Fremont 
County Sch. Dist. No. 25, 558 F.2d 982, 984-85 (10th Cir. 1977) 
(high school principal's statements concerning career education 
and football seating practices were part of his official 
functions and were related to internal affairs of school system 
and thus not subject to First Amendment protection). 
His statements alleging inappropriate and illegal 
conduct on the part of DPS employees involved with the computer 
6 
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selection committee, however, arguably touch on a matter of 
public concern because the committee is involved in government 
procurement. On the other hand, the committee's discussions as 
to what type of computer vendor can best serve DPS's needs may 
properly be considered part of the internal affairs of DPS and 
thus not implicate the First Amendment. 
Yet even if Horn's speech concerning the selection 
committee practices is considered to involve matters of public 
concern, Horn must demonstrate a causal connection between such 
speech and his termination. Save, 785 F.2d at 866. After 
reviewing all of the evidence in the record, it is the opinion of 
this court that Horn has made an insufficient showing that he was 
terminated for the speech in question. 
Essentially, the remainder of Horn's retaliation claim 
consists of a recitation of his protestations of alleged illegal 
and improper actions of DPS employees during the selection 
process. He then lists several subsequent incidents, including 
disciplinary actions initiated against him, and summarily states 
that the described incidents occurred because he spoke out 
against the handling of the selection process. Horn has done 
little more than make bald assertions of belief regarding the 
requisite nexus in his memorandum and his affidavit, both of 
7 
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which are filled with what amounts to largely unsubstantiated 
speculation as to the reasons for his termination. 
The timing of Horn's termination also casts doubt on 
whether Horn could carry his burden of proof on the causation 
issue. The computer vendor selection process occurred in 1987-
88. It was not until November of 1989, however, that the DPS 
sent Horn a letter notifying him of its intent to terminate his 
employment. This action was prompted by a memo drafted by Squire 
on October 31, 1989 in which he requested that Horn be terminated 
because he was a security risk, insubordinate, and had committed 
perjury. Not only was the alleged retaliation for his speech 
delayed for at least a year, but Squire, the person who initially 
requested Horn's termination, was not a DPS employee during the 
time of the selection process. 
As indicated above, to demonstrate that there is a 
genuine issue of material fact, the evidence must be such that a 
reasonable fact finder could find for Horn. See Liberty Lobby, 
477 U.S. at 249; Clifton. 924 F.2d at 183. The causal connection 
here is simply too tenuous to pass that test. Therefore, the 




The liberty interest Horn claims the defendants 
infringed is that in his reputation and also in his ability to 
secure employment in his chosen occupation.5 Because the claim 
is for a constitutional deprivation made against state actors,6 
Horn must show more than-simple defamation to prevail at trial. 
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701-10 (1976). He must show "stigma 
plus." Neu v. Corcoran, 869 F.2d 662, 667 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 493 U.S. 816 (1989). Courts have defined the elements of 
such a claim as follows: (1) the defamation must occur in the 
course of the termination of employment; (2) the government 
officials' statements must be stigmatizing or attach a badge of 
shame to the employee being terminated, thereby impairing the 
employee's ability to pursue future employment; (3) the 
statements must be false; (4) the statements must have been made 
4
 Because Horn has failed to carry his burden on the 
causation issue, the defendants' burden to show they would have 
reached the same decision in the aibsence of Horn's speaking out is 
not triggered. See Save, 785 F.2d at 866. 
5
 Horn concedes that he has not raised a claim based on 
the taking of a property interest without due process of law. 
(PL's Supp. Mem. Opp. at 3.). 
6
 Actually, although Horn apparently seeks to implicate 
all of the defendants in this claim, the record only supports an 




The liberty interest Horn claims the defendants 
infringed is that in his reputation and also in his ability to 
secure employment in his chosen occupation-5 Because the claim 
is for a constitutional deprivation made against state actors,6 
Horn must show more than simple defamation to prevail at trial. 
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701-10 (1976). He must show "stigma 
plus." Neu v. Corcoran, 869 F.2d 662, 667 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 493 U.S. 816 (1989). Courts have defined the elements of 
such a claim as follows: (1) the defamation must occur in the 
course of the termination of employment; (2) the government 
officials' statements must be stigmatizing or attach a badge of 
shame to the employee being terminated, thereby impairing the 
employee's ability to pursue future employment; (3) the 
statements must be false; (4) the statements must have been made 
4
 Because Horn has failed to carry his burden on the 
causation issue, the defendants' burden to show they would have 
reached the same decision in the absence of Horn's speaking out is 
not triggered. See Save. 785 F.2d at 866. 
5
 Horn concedes that he has not raised a claim based on 
the taking of a property interest without due process of law. 
(PL's Supp. Mem. Opp. at 3.). 
6
 Actually, although Horn apparently seeks to implicate 
all of the defendants in this claim, the record only supports an 
arguable claim against Squire. (See, e.g.. Horn Aff. %% 61-63.) 
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public; and, if the first three elements are met, (4) the 
employee did not have a meaningful opportunity to clear the 
employee's name, Paul, 424 U.S. at 710; Board of Regents v. 
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1971); Wisconsin v. Constantineau. 400 
U.S. 433, 437-39 (1971); JJeu, 869 F.2d at 667-69; Asbill v. 
Housing Auth.. 726 F.2d 1499, 1503-04 (10th Cir. 1984). Even 
assuming Horn could make out the first three elements, the 
evidence in the record currently before the court clearly 
establishes that he cannot satisfy the fourth element. The 
record amply reflects that Horn had a constitutionally sufficient 
opportunity to clear his name through the administrative process 
in his agency and through appellate procedures available in the 
Utah courts. 
The procedures available to Horn are summarized as 
follows. On October 31, 1989, Squire wrote a detailed memo to 
Brant Johnson ("Johnson"), a Deputy Commissioner of DPS. Squire 
requested that Horn be terminated because Squire perceived him to 
be a security risk. Squire also stated in the memo that he had 
evidence that Horn had lied under oath in an administrative 
proceeding, and that he judged Horn's conduct to be insubordinate. 
On November 13, 1989, Johnson sent Horn a letter stating it was 
the intent of the DPS to sever its employment relationship with 
10 
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Horn. The letter described the reasons for this action and also 
stated Horn would be contacted by an administrative law judge to 
set a time, date, and place for a pre-termination hearing. 
On December 7, 1989, Gill, who was then representing 
Horn, wrote to an employee of DPS that the first days he would be 
available for the hearing would be December 13, 14, or 15. Gill 
specifically waived the apparent administrative rule that such 
hearings be held within ten days. He made a request for 
administrative discovery and also acknowledged that the hearing 
would be a de novo review of the decision to terminate Horn's 
employment. If the administrative law judge ruled adverse to 
Horn, his next recourse would be to Bodrero, who was the 
Commissioner of DPS. 
Subsequently, Gill met with Bodrero, and indicated he 
wanted to bypass the de novo evidentiary hearing and instead 
preferred to submit written argument directly to Bodrero. On 
December 14, Bodrero wrote Gill to confirm what they discussed at 
the meeting.7 Bodrero ordered a DPS employee to provide Gill 
7
 Bodrero also wrote: 
As I said in our meeting, I am 
disappointed that you have chosen not to 
avail yourself of the opportunity to 
participate in the evidentiary hearing 
11 
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with the specific information supporting the intent to dismiss 
letter, per Gill's request. Gill then had five days to respond 
in writing to this information. Bodrero would then conduct his 
own investigation into the matter. On December 21, Johnson sent 
Gill a detailed letter describing the reasons supporting the 
intent to terminate letter. On January 8, 1990, Gill responded 
to the allegations contained in Johnson's December 21 
correspondence with a nineteen page letter, not including 
exhibits. On January 18, 1990, Bodrero informed Gill of his 
decision to terminate Hom, effective that day. 
On January 19, Gill wrote to Bodrero that he was 
interested in working out an agreement whereby Hom could return 
to his job with DPS. Ten days later, Hom himself sent notice to 
the Utah State Career Service Review Board ("CSRB") that he was 
appealing Bodrero's termination decision. Applicable procedures 
process that usually takes place prior to the 
time I am asked to make a decision on an 
employee dismissal case. The purpose of the 
evidentiary hearing would have been to 
provide me with a more complete picture of 
this matter prior to my having to decide it. 
Since you have chosen to bypass the 
evidentiary hearing, I consider the process 
described above as the next best way to 
proceed. 
The "process" referred to is described below. 
12 
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provided that the CSRB would hear this appeal and conduct a de 
novo evidentiary review on matters relating to Horn's termination. 
However, the decision to terminate Horn had apparently been 
revoked pending settlement discussions, but the discussions were 
not fruitful and on March 8, 1990, Bodrero sent Horn a final 
termination letter, noting that Gill had refused an offer of 
settlement. Bodrero advised in his letter that Horn had the right 
to appeal his decision to the CSRB. 
Gill sent a notice of appeal to the CSRB and requested 
the de novo evidentiary hearing at the earliest opportunity. The 
hearing was scheduled for April 23-24, 1990. However, a few days 
before the hearing, Gill moved for a continuance. The hearing 
was continued without a date. Horn v. Administrative Servs. Div., 
No. 8 CSRB/H.O. 106 (Utah C.S.R.B. Apr. 18, 1990) (notice of 
continuance). On October 30, 1990, the CSRB wrote Gill, 
believing that Horn had filed suit and asked Gill what his 
intentions were vis-a-vis continuing the grievance procedure. 
Gill responded that Horn had not yet filed suit, but requested an 
indefinite stay of the grievance proceedings pending the outcome 
of the litigation he implied he would file. 
Approximately two and one-half years later, the CSRB 
entered an order dismissing Horn's appeal of Bodrero's decision. 
13 
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The basis for the dismissal was Horn's failure to prosecute. Horn 
v. Administrative Servs. Div.. No. 8 CSRB/H.O. 106 (Utah C.S.R.B. 
Apr. 8, 1993) (order and final agency action dismissing appeal). 
The order was issued after the CSRB had entered an Order to Show 
Cause Why Appeal Should not be Dismissed, issued December 8, 1992 
and the CSRB's subsequent Order and Notice Setting Forth Deadline 
for Dismissal if Case not Timely Prosecuted, issued January 28, 
1993. Id. The CSRB's January 28 Order directed Horn to request 
the CSRB to schedule an evidentiary hearing on or before March 
31, 1993, or Horn's appeal would be dismissed. Horn apparently 
failed to do so, and thus his appeal was dismissed. The Utah 
Court of Appeals subsequently upheld the CSRB's action. Horn v. 
Administrative Servs. Div.. No. 930307-CA (Utah Ct. App. Aug. 19, 
1993) (per curiam). 
As the above reference to procedures available to Horn 
amply demonstrates, Horn was afforded substantial pre- and post-
termination procedural safeguards. Before he was officially 
terminated he was given notice of the allegations against him and 
chose to challenge them in the form of a letter to Bodrero. Such 
constitutes adequate pre-termination due process• See, e.g. . 
West v. Grand County, 967 F.2d 362, 367 (10th Cir, 1992) (pre-
termination hearing need not be elaborate, employee must only be 
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afforded notice and opportunity to be heard). Horn eschewed the 
other pre-termination procedures as well as the post-termination 
procedures. He cannot claim that because he failed to take 
advantage of these opportunities he was not afforded due process. 
Had he taken advantage of these procedures he would have been 
afforded ample opportunity to disprove the allegations alleged as 
the basis for his termination and ample opportunity to clear any 
stigma attached to his name by the defendants' alleged actions. 
Horn's claim that he was deprived of a liberty interest without 
due process thus must fail. Therefore, defendants' motion for 
summary judgment on this issue is granted. 
Accordingly, based on the foregoing, and good cause 
appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment is granted. 
Dated this \}9^ day of December, 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 





Copies of the foregoing Order were mailed, postage 
prepaid, this /^ » day of December, 1994, addressed as 
follows: 
J. Mark Ward, Esq. 
Assistant Attorney General 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
L. Zane Gill, Esq. 
215 South State St., Suite 545 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 









A. Roland Squire, Arthur J. 
Hudachko, Douglas Bodrero, and 
John Does 1-10. j 
Defendants. : 
: JUDGMENT 
Case No. 91-C-1016W 
In accordance with the Memorandum Decision and Order 
entered this date which grants summary judgment to the defendants 
and against the plaintiffs, and pursuant to Rule 58 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows: 
1. Judgment is entered in favor of the defendants and 
against the plaintiff of dismissal with prejudice of plaintiff's 
Amended Verified Complaint. 
1 
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2. All of the parties are to bear their own attorney 
fees and costs. 
Dated this isk day of December, 1994 
BY THE COURT: 
David K. Winder 
Chief Judge 
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Copies of the foregoing Judgment were mailed, postage 
prepaid, this /4£ day of December, 1994, addressed as 
follows: 
J. Mark Ward, Esq. 
Assistant Attorney General 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
L. Zane Gill, Esq. 
215 South State St., Suite 545 












A. ROLAND SQUIRE, et al., 
Defendant(s). 
Case No. 91-C-1016 W 
O R D E R 
Plaintiff's October 11, 1994 motion to amend complaint was briefed by the 
parties and argued at a hearing held October 31 , 1994, at-which the Honorable 
Judge Ronald N. Boyce presided. Plaintiff was represented at the October 31st 
hearing by his attorney of record L. Zane Gi'!, and defendants were represented by 
their attorney of record, Assistant Attorney General J. Mark Ward. 
At the October 3 1 , 1994 hearing, the magistrate judge requested 
supplemental briefing by the parties, and the magistrate judge took the motion to 
amend under advisement pending submission and review of those supplemental 
briefs. The parties did submit supplemental briefs subsequent to the October 31st 
hearing, as requested. 
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On Friday November 18, 1994, at the end of the hearing in this case but on 
another issue, the magistrate judge announced to the parties9 counsel a decision 
to deny the motion to amend. The basis of the ruling is as follows: 
1 • Plaintiff's motion for leave to amend and bring a cause of action for 
handicap discrimination under Sectton 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 
U.S.C. § 794, and/or 42 U.S.C. S 1983, is denied for two reasons: 
A. In the interest of just and orderly judicial administration, and under 
Rule 15(b) Fed. R. of Civ. P., such an amendment is untimely in that 
it would unduly prejudice defendants in maintaining their defense of 
the present action upon the merits. 
B. Utah's 4-year personal injury statute of limitations (Utah Code § 
78-12-25 (1994)) governs plaintiff's proposed Section 504 claim. 
The original complaint herein was filed within four years after 
plaintiff's employment was terminated, but the present motion to 
amend was not filed within four years of that emplcpyment 
termination. Plaintiff's proposed amended claim under Section 504 
does not properly relate back to the date of the original pleading 
herein, for purposes of Rule 15(c)(2) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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Therefore, there is a significant issue of the application of the statute 
of limitations. 
2. The court expressly declines to rule in the present context on the law 
concerning accrual and tolling of causes of action and how the law may or may 
not affect tne validity of a handicap discrimination claim under the controlling 
statute of limitations. The present posture of the case does not present facts 
upon which to make such a ruling. 
3. The court also denies plaintiff's motion to amend to further state a cause 
of action for liberty interest violations without due process under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 (hereinafter "liberty interest claim"). This amendment is unnecessary, 
because the liberty interest claim was already effectively plead and preserved and 
is being litigated before the court in the present action. 
DATED this Q day of December 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
^ ^ ^ ^ 
Ronald N. Boyce 
United States Magistrate Judge 
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United States District Court 
for the 
District of Utah 
December 9, 1994 
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